Open Source · · 29 days

ShapedPlugin Pro builds backdoored in the vendor pipeline

Attackers injected a self-deleting loader into ShapedPlugin's commercial Pro plugin builds distributed through the vendor's Easy Digital Downloads update endpoint. The dropped payload installed a fake WooCommerce plugin with webshells, Adminer, and a 2FA stealer.

Wordfence disclosed in June 2026 that attackers had compromised the build and distribution pipeline of ShapedPlugin, LLC, a WordPress plugin vendor with more than 400,000 active installations of its free products, and had been shipping backdoored commercial builds to paying customers since late May.

ShapedPlugin sells Pro versions of carousel, slider, and testimonial plugins through Easy Digital Downloads at account.shapedplugin.com, while the free versions live on WordPress.org. Only the Pro builds were poisoned. Wordfence called that selectivity notable: the attacker could deploy to both channels but chose the one without WordPress.org's malware scanning, and the one whose users had paid. Site owners who followed every piece of standard advice, buying a license and updating through the official vendor channel, were the ones who got the backdoor.

Wordfence obtained a backdoored copy of Real Testimonials Pro 3.2.5 directly from the vendor's update endpoint on June 12, 2026. It contained a file named src/Includes/LicenseLoader.php, loaded on every admin page by a modified TestimonialPRO.php. The loader pulled a payload from a command-and-control server at 194.76.217.28:2871, installed it with WordPress's own Plugin_Upgrader class, reported the victim domain, then deleted itself and stripped its hook from TestimonialPRO.php. The dropped plugin installed as woocommerce-subscription, singular, a near-match for the legitimate WooCommerce Subscriptions, and hid itself from the plugin list through the all_plugins filter. Inside were Tiny File Manager 2.6, Adminer 5.2.1, a URL parameter webshell, a REST backdoor at /wp-json/wc/v3/settings/apply that accepted arbitrary file writes, and a login bypass keyed to a hardcoded MD5 hash.

The credential module was the part that made cleanup hard. It hooked wp_authenticate and wp_login to capture plaintext passwords, session cookies, and roles, and then went looking for TOTP seeds belonging to four specific two-factor plugins: WP 2FA, Wordfence Login Security, Really Simple SSL 2FA, and the Two-Factor plugin. Everything went to generate.2faplugin.org, a domain registered to blend into legitimate 2FA traffic. With both a password and a TOTP seed, an attacker keeps access after the victim rotates the password. Timestamps inside the compromised ZIP pointed at an automated build step rather than hand tampering, with four files changed on May 21 inside a two-hour window against a baseline of 366 files from April 2025 and 100 from February 2026. Wordfence contacted ShapedPlugin on June 15, and the vendor said the following day that it had begun an investigation, was reviewing its distribution and release processes, and would publish verified rebuilds. A related backdoor in Product Slider Pro had already been assigned CVE-2026-49777 and patched in 3.5.4, but Wordfence found compromised packages still being served for other Pro products at the time of writing.

Notes

  • Only Pro builds distributed through the vendor's Easy Digital Downloads endpoint were affected. Wordfence confirmed the free plugins on WordPress.org were not compromised, despite the attacker having deploy access to both channels.
  • Wordfence read file timestamps inside the compromised ZIP as evidence of an automated build-step injection. 4 files were modified on 2026-05-21 within a two-hour window, against 366 files from 2025-04-22 and 100 from 2026-02-25. A composer installed.php git reference of d0f349c04c2a3578a65b7e17bcabc84152a61b12 indicates the package was built from a private repository.
  • CVE-2026-49777 was assigned to a related Product Slider Pro backdoor and reported as patched in 3.5.4. Wordfence describes CVE-2026-49777 as a duplicate of CVE-2026-10735.
  • Wordfence examined all other ShapedPlugin Pro plugins available as of 2026-06-15 and found no LicenseLoader.php or associated C2 indicators, but could not rule out earlier compromised versions since replaced. Bundle packages may also be affected.
  • Both C2 hosts are registered to AEZA GROUP LLC. The domain 2faplugin.org was updated on 2026-05-10, shortly before the backdoor injection timestamps.

Appendix · Affected releases

testimonial-pro wordpress fixed 3.2.6
  • Wordfence obtained a backdoored copy of 3.2.5 directly from the official vendor update endpoint on 2026-06-12. 3.2.6 is the clean rebuild.
  • ShapedPlugin's incident advisory identifies 3.2.4 as a malicious package distributed around 2026-05-16. It also distinguishes the clean 3.2.5 released on 2026-05-23 from a byte-different, tampered 3.2.5 served from 2026-06-12 through 2026-06-16. A version label alone therefore cannot identify which 3.2.5 archive a site received.
woo-product-slider-pro wordpress fixed 3.5.3
  • ShapedPlugin's incident advisory identifies only 3.5.2 as compromised and 3.5.3 or later as clean. Earlier reporting described versions before 3.5.4 under CVE-2026-49777.
  • The first-party incident review supersedes the earlier broad affected range, so the compromised release is enumerated rather than represented as a wildcard.
smart-show-post-pro wordpress fixed 4.0.2
  • ShapedPlugin's incident statement identifies 4.0.1 as compromised and 4.0.2 as the first clean release under CVE-2026-10735.
  • The vendor's later incident review narrows the earlier <4.0.2 range to the exact 4.0.1 release.

Indicators

  • advisoryCVE-2026-10735
  • advisoryCVE-2026-49777
  • filesrc/Includes/LicenseLoader.php
  • filewp-content/plugins/woocommerce-subscription/
  • filewp-content/plugins/woocommerce-notification/
  • fileinstall-persistent.php
  • fileclass-wc-subscription-trace-dispatch.php
  • fileclass-wc-subscription-diagnostics.php
  • fileclass-wc-subscription-scheduler.php
  • domaingenerate.2faplugin.org
  • ipv4194.76.217.28
  • port2871
  • endpoint/wp-json/wc/v3/settings/apply
  • md5e268c35a06d85f672e70c9beecb4e5d1

References

  1. PSA: Supply Chain Compromise Targets ShapedPlugin, Backdoored Pro Plugins Distributed via Official Channels - Wordfencewordfence.com
  2. ShapedPlugin WordPress Pro Plugins Backdoored in Supply Chain Attack - The Hacker Newsthehackernews.com
  3. ShapedPlugin update flow hacked to infect WordPress sites - BleepingComputerbleepingcomputer.com
  4. ShapedPlugin Supply Chain Attack Backdoors Pro Plugin Updates - Security Affairssecurityaffairs.com
  5. Security Advisory - Real Testimonials Pro 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 Compromise - ShapedPlugindocs.shapedplugin.com
  6. Security Advisory - Woo Product Slider Pro 3.5.2 Compromise - ShapedPlugindocs.shapedplugin.com

Source record: oss/attacks/shapedplugin/meta.yaml