node-ipc npm account shipped credential stealer

Four years after a maintainer of the widely used node-ipc npm package sabotaged it in protest over the war in Ukraine, the project was hit again on May 14, 2026, this time by an outside attacker who hijacked a dormant co-maintainer's account through an expired email domain and shipped a new credential stealer to users in a span of 56 seconds.

node-ipc is a node.js inter-process communication library that recorded more than 800,000 weekly downloads at the time of the compromise. Three new versions appeared on the npm registry in quick succession: 12.0.1 at 14:25:30 UTC, 9.2.3 at 14:26:01, and 9.1.6 at 14:26:25, all signed by atiertant, a dormant co-maintainer account. Researchers at Socket said the attacker had re-registered the lapsed domain that backed the maintainer's email, run a standard npm password reset, and reached publish without touching the project's GitHub repository or any active maintainer's machine. Socket's scanner flagged the releases within three minutes. This was a separate event from the 2022 protestware incident associated with the project's original author.

A static comparison against the prior release showed the main ESM file unchanged. According to Socket, all three tarballs carried an identical 80 KB block of obfuscated JavaScript appended to node-ipc.cjs after the legitimate exports, meaning CommonJS consumers, the more common path, were the ones that would execute it. The payload fired via setImmediate() during module load, exposed itself under the export __ntRun, and forked a detached child marked with the environment variable __ntw=1, which served as both a re-execution lock and a process tag. The collector enumerated 113 paths on Linux and 127 on macOS, including SSH keys, AWS, Azure, and GCP credential files, .npmrc, .env files, Kubernetes and Docker configurations, npm tokens, database connection strings, and configurations for AI tooling such as .claude.json and .kiro/settings/mcp.json, along with the full process environment and host details from uname and /etc/hosts.

Output staged under <tmpdir>/nt-<pid>/. According to Socket, the collector tarred the staged data with every file timestamped to October 26, 1985, HMAC-signed the archive with an embedded key, and exfiltrated it over DNS TXT queries against the bt.node.js zone using a custom base-16 reversed-nibble scheme, with bootstrap name resolution through sh.azurestaticprovider.net, a domain built to pass as Azure infrastructure. The choice of DNS was deliberate: most CI egress filters would have caught an outbound HTTPS POST. Outwardly the package still looked like node-ipc, with name, repository metadata, README, certificates, and API files intact. The break was in the registry distribution channel itself, where a fresh install or a permissive semver range could resolve to the malicious release without any downstream code review, and the latest dist-tag pointed at 12.0.1, so unversioned installs picked up the malicious build until npm pulled the releases.