Campaign · Proprietary · · 2312 days

Magento extension vendors shipped license backdoors

Tigren, Meetanshi, and MGS extension downloads carried PHP license-check backdoors. Sansec found 21 affected Magento modules, with abuse active by April 2025.

Draws together 3 incidents across 3 packages

This is not a generic Magento backdoor record. Magento is an ecosystem, and most Magento malware reaches stores through stolen admin credentials, old vulnerabilities, uploaded webshells, or injected checkout JavaScript. This record is narrower: Sansec found vendor-distributed extension packages that already carried the same PHP backdoor.

The confirmed supply-chain scope covered Tigren, Meetanshi, and Magesolution (MGS). Sansec identified 21 affected modules published between 2019 and 2022, and reported that the vendor download servers had been breached. A Weltpixel GoogleTagManager package looked suspicious too, but Sansec could not establish where it had been altered.

The inserted code posed as license logic. A fake License.php or LicenseApi.php file was loaded from registration.php, and adminLoadLicense executed attacker-controlled $licenseFile content as PHP. Older 2019 variants did not require authentication; later variants added vendor-specific keys such as requestKey and dataSign checks.

The code stayed quiet for years. Sansec reported active use since at least 2025-04-20 and estimated that 500 to 1,000 stores were running affected software, including one large multinational. Vendor response was uneven: Meetanshi confirmed a server hack while disputing package tampering, Tigren denied compromise, and MGS did not respond.

Notes

  • The users value records Sansec's upper estimate of stores running affected software, not individual shoppers or confirmed data-theft victims.
  • FishPig's 2022 Magento extension compromise is tracked separately because it involved a different vendor, payload, and date window.
  • PolyShell, Xurum, MagnetoCore, and generic Magento webshell reports describe post-install exploitation or store compromise. They are related Magento ecosystem activity, but not modeled here as vendor-distributed poisoned artifacts.
  • Tigren, Meetanshi, and MGS are modeled as separate attacks because each vendor download path is a separate trust boundary.
  • Weltpixel remains campaign context because the reporting treated it as suspicious but did not confirm where the package was altered.

Incidents in this campaign

  1. MGS Magento extensions shipped license backdoors
  2. Meetanshi Magento extensions shipped license backdoors
  3. Tigren Magento extensions shipped license backdoors

Appendix · Affected packages

Samples and hashes sit on each incident page, linked above

References

  1. Magento supply chain attack compromises hundreds of e-storesbleepingcomputer.com
  2. Backdoor found in popular ecommerce componentssansec.io
  3. Sansec uncovered a supply chain attack via 21 backdoored Magento extensionssecurityaffairs.com
  4. Backdoor Activates in Magento Supply Chain Attack Impacting 1000 Storescyberinsider.com
  5. Hundreds of e-commerce sites hacked in supply-chain attackarstechnica.com

Source record: proprietary/campaigns/magento-license-backdoor-2025/meta.yaml