Open Source 2002-09-28 · 8 days ·Backdoor, Remote Code Execution

Sendmail FTP tarball shipped trojan

The official Sendmail FTP server, ftp.sendmail.org, was compromised and the 8.12.6 .tar.gz and .tar.Z source archives were replaced with trojanized versions; HTTP downloads were not believed affected.

Story

From about September 28 to October 6, 2002, the official Sendmail FTP server distributed trojaned copies of the 8.12.6 source archives. The compromise hit one of the Internet's default pieces of mail infrastructure: administrators who fetched source from the trusted FTP path could build a backdoored Sendmail without ever touching an exploit against a running daemon.

The delivery was limited but dangerous. The .tar.gz and .tar.Z archives on FTP were affected; HTTP downloads were not believed affected. The Register later quoted Eric Allman saying the attacker may have modified the FTP program itself so that roughly one in ten downloads received the backdoor while the original package remained untouched.

The code diff shows the backdoor inserted into libsm/t-shm.c. It declared shm64, called it from the shared-memory test path, decoded an embedded payload into a temporary test script, and executed it with system("sh ./test 2>/dev/null").

That payload forked a process and connected to spatula.aclue.com at 66.37.138.99 on TCP/6667. From there, the attacker could open a shell with the privileges of the build user. Analysts also noted that its one-letter command syntax resembled the OpenSSH backdoor from the same year: A killed the exploit, D executed a command, and M put it to sleep.

Affected Artifacts

Incident Context

Motive
Unauthorized Access Control
Attribution
Person
Cause
Compromised Infrastructure
Transitive
No
Actor
Individual Hacker

External References

Source record: oss/attacks/sendmail/meta.yaml